targeted financial sanctions are actions taken by governments or international institutions against persons and entities with specific characteristics to prevent them from engaging in dangerous activities by restricting their access to financial resources and services. The main question of the present study is what is the legal nature of targeted financial sanctions and how it is applied in the legal system? This study shows that many of the criticisms that have entered into this type of sanctions,Like its uncertainty, the deprivation of persons of the right to trial and the right to defense, etc. is incorrect and is due to the confusion of the nature of this institution with punishment. The use of targeted financial sanctions to prevent the financing of terrorism requires a change in the definition of the crime of terrorist financing, so that in the definition of this crime, in addition to financing terrorist acts, the financing of terrorist organizations and individual terrorists must also be considered. This would result that the competent authorities do not need to establish and prove the connection between the funds and other assets of these persons with a specific terrorist act in order to freezing their property.

According to the Political Economy Theory, Economic and political structures can to affect managers, auditors and investors behavior in the face of the financial reporting. One of the best examples of political and macroeconomic actions in recent years is the economic sanctions against Iran. Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange also inevitably have influenced by the pressures of economic sanctions against Iran. The purpose of this paper is to determine the effect of economic sanctions on the value relevance of financial statements. The data have been analyzed using a sample of 165 listed firms in the Tehran Stock Exchange during from 2001 to 2014 and panel data regression models. The results show that the value relevance of net income and book value of equity reduced in the period of economic sanctions. In addition, the value relevance of financial statements in the Destress firms has affected by economic sanctions more than other companies.

Introduction and Objectivesanctions have long been one of the most critical external shocks shaping the dynamics of Iran’s economy. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been repeatedly subjected to unilateral and multilateral sanctions, particularly by the United States and its allies, which have targeted key financial and energy sectors. These sanctions disrupt financial transactions, limit international trade, and impose barriers on capital flows, thereby altering the structure and behavior of domestic markets.      In a non-sanctioned environment, investors typically diversify by entering competing or parallel foreign markets, effectively managing investment risk across multiple asset classes. sanctions, however, restrict such options, forcing investors to rely more heavily on domestic markets and alternative assets such as cryptocurrencies. These shifts in investment strategies highlight the importance of understanding how sanctions affect network causal relationships among domestic financial markets.      Clause 22 of Iran’s Resistance Economy policy emphasizes mobilizing national resources and improving resilience against external pressures. Understanding inter-market spillovers under sanction conditions is thus vital, not only for academic knowledge but also for policymaking, portfolio management, and systemic risk assessment. The present study aims to analyze the spillover dynamics and causal interdependencies among three key markets of Iran—Tehran Stock Exchange, the foreign exchange market, and the cryptocurrency market—over the period 1390–1401 SH (2011–2022 AD).      The primary objectives of the study are: To quantify spillover effects between financial markets during sanction periods. To identify structural breaks in market interconnections caused by specific sanction episodes. To evaluate the systemic role of each market as a transmitter or receiver of shocks. To provide evidence-based recommendations for policymaking in line with the Resistance Economy strategy. 2. Methods and MaterialsTo capture the time-varying interdependencies between markets, the study employs the Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression (TVP-VAR) model. This model, introduced by Primiceri (2005) and further extended by Koop & Korobilis (2014), allows parameters to evolve over time, making it suitable for capturing the dynamic and nonlinear nature of financial linkages, especially during turbulent periods such as sanctions. Data and Period: The dataset covers the period from 16/11/1390 (February 2012) to 20/10/1401 (January 2023), using daily observations. Markets Analyzed: Tehran Stock Exchange Index (TPI) – as a representative of equity performance. Foreign Exchange Market – USD/IRR daily free-market exchange rate. Cryptocurrency Market – Bitcoin returns as the leading cryptocurrency. Variables: Logarithmic daily returns of each market were calculated to ensure stationarity and comparability. Sources: Exchange rates were collected from the Central Bank of Iran, stock data from BourseView, and Bitcoin prices from com. Analytical Approach: A baseline VAR model was constructed to identify inter-market interactions. TVP-VAR was employed to account for parameter changes across time. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (GFEVD) was used to measure spillover intensities, following the approach of Diebold & Yilmaz (2012). Sensitivity analysis was conducted in two ways: (a) event-by-event (individual sanctions such as the Central Bank sanction, sanctions on energy and financial sectors, and sanction on 18 Iranian banks), and (b) comprehensive (aggregating sanctions into five distinct phases). The TVP-VAR model enables computation of: Total Connectedness Index (TCI): The average level of network spillovers across markets, representing systemic risk. Net Spillover Index (NET): Identifies whether a market acts as a net transmitter (positive NET) or receiver (negative NET) of shocks. 3. Research FindingsThe results from sensitivity analysis revealed key insights into how sanctions reshaped inter-market relationships: -Event-specific analysis: Central Bank Sanction (2019): TCI rose from 3. 22% to 5. 54%, reflecting a 67% increase in inter-market connectedness. The stock market remained a net receiver, foreign exchange a strong transmitter, and cryptocurrency shifted toward greater vulnerability. financial and Energy Sector sanctions (2018): TCI increased from 3. 26% to 5. 17%. Cryptocurrencies’ role weakened dramatically, showing nearly zero spillover transmission, while the stock market’s negative NET deepened. 18 Bank sanctions (2020): The most disruptive sanction. TCI rose from 3. 24% to 5. 15%. Here, the cryptocurrency market switched roles from transmitter to receiver, highlighting its fragility under systemic banking restrictions.  -Comprehensive phase analysis: Dividing the entire period into five phases provided clearer patterns: Phase 1 (Pre-JCPOA withdrawal): Cryptocurrency (NET=+0. 67) acted as a transmitter, stock market (NET=−0. 78) and forex (NET=+0. 11) showed mixed roles. Phase 2 (Post-JCPOA withdrawal to financial/energy sanctions): Forex became the dominant transmitter (NET=+3. 10), while both crypto (NET=−1. 54) and stocks (NET=−1. 56) were receivers. Phase 3 (financial/Energy sanctions to Central Bank sanction): Forex remained a transmitter (NET=+1. 94), while crypto (−0. 32) and stocks (−1. 61) remained receivers. Phase 4 (Central Bank sanction to 18 Bank sanction): Cryptocurrency briefly resumed a transmitter role (+0. 37), forex (+0. 19) remained transmitter, while stocks (−0. 57) stayed vulnerable. Phase 5 (18 Bank sanction to end of study): A significant structural shift: forex (+2. 41) and stocks (+2. 37) both emerged as transmitters, while crypto turned into a strong receiver (−0. 04). -Total Connectedness Index (TCI): Across all phases, TCI fluctuated between 3. 16% and 6. 63%, peaking during the fifth phase, signaling heightened systemic risk and tighter network integration under sanctions. DiscussionThe findings confirm that sanctions are not only external shocks but also structural breakpoints for domestic financial markets. Several critical insights emerge: Dominant Role of Forex: The foreign exchange market consistently acted as the primary transmitter of shocks, underlining its systemic importance. This reflects Iran’s heavy reliance on foreign currency markets as both a channel for external shocks and a driver of domestic volatility. Stock Market Vulnerability: The Tehran Stock Exchange was persistently a net receiver of shocks. Its sensitivity to currency volatility and sanctions implies weak hedging capacity and limited resilience. Cryptocurrency’s Dual Role: Unlike forex or stocks, the cryptocurrency market displayed a shifting role, alternating between transmitter and receiver. This duality suggests that crypto markets, while offering temporary alternatives for sanction evasion, are highly unstable and reactive to systemic stress. Structural Shifts Post-2020: The sanctions on 18 Iranian banks marked a turning point, intensifying inter-market connectedness and reshaping roles. This indicates the fragility of financial intermediation in Iran and the high exposure of cryptocurrencies to institutional restrictions. Policy Alignment with Resistance Economy: The results support Clause 22 of the Resistance Economy policy, highlighting the need for coordinated resource mobilization and risk management strategies in times of external pressure. 5. ConclusionThe study concludes that sanctions significantly alter the causal network structure of Iran’s financial markets, raising systemic risks and reshaping market roles: The foreign exchange market remains the central transmitter of shocks. The stock market is predominantly vulnerable as a shock receiver. The cryptocurrency market exhibits instability, alternating roles depending on sanction type and timing.      These results highlight the necessity for targeted economic policies to stabilize forex markets, protect equities, and regulate cryptocurrency flows. Without such measures, sanctions will continue to amplify systemic risks and undermine investor confidence. 6. Implications and Future Research1. Policy Implications: Policymakers should prioritize stabilizing the forex market through effective currency management, while designing mechanisms to shield the stock market from external shocks. Additionally, regulated domestic alternatives to cryptocurrencies could prevent spillovers from volatile digital assets. Establishing monitoring institutions for currency and crypto markets will enhance transparency and reduce systemic risks. 2. Investor Implications: Investors should recognize the persistent systemic role of forex and the fragility of equities under sanctions. Portfolio diversification strategies must account for cryptocurrencies’ unstable dual role. 3. Future Research: Comparative studies across other sanctioned economies (e. g., Russia, Venezuela) could provide cross-country evidence on sanction-induced spillovers. Expanding the network to include commodities such as gold and oil would further enrich systemic risk analysis. Methodologically, combining TVP-VAR with wavelet coherence or machine-learning approaches may yield deeper insights into dynamic contagion patterns.

The imposition of financial messaging sanctions against select states in recent years has proven to be a markedly effective measure within the realm of international affairs. In this context, the Society for Worldwide Interbank financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) has been particularly targeted by sanctioning entities- such as political blocs and sovereign governments- as a potent instrument to exert coercive pressure on recalcitrant states. This development has, in turn, prompted certain affected states to seek out alternative financial networks and technological solutions to circumvent the SWIFT system. Concurrently, the advent of recent advancements in financial and blockchain-based technologies has given rise to the notion of establishing faster, more cost-effective, and more transparent monetary transaction mechanisms as potential replacements for the existing SWIFT infrastructure. This confluence of developments has raised a series of issues in public international law that warrant rigorous examination. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, this article seeks to elucidate the multifaceted legal challenges surrounding the sanctioning of the SWIFT system in the realm of international law. While introducing the significance of SWIFT and exploring the relevant domestic laws in Iran, it critically examines the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of the international sanctions imposed on the SWIFT network. Furthermore, it evaluates the responses of various states to the SWIFT-related sanctions and some of the alternative solutions proposed by governments. Findings suggest that the imposition of sanctions on the SWIFT network has had profound implications on the global financial landscape. One key consequence has been the acceleration of efforts by sanctioned states to develop and implement alternative financial messaging systems, such as Russia's SPFS (System for Transfer of financial Messages) and China's CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System).

Since the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the country has been continuously subject to severe sanctions by the Western countries, especially the United States. In all these years, the U. S. sanctions did not affect Iran’, s economy much, due to the fact that the two countries have no formal relations and as a result, their economies are not, by any means, interdependent. However, Iran’, s economy has been reliant on extensive interactions with the European countries,the EU sanctions against Iran since 2011, therefore, have harshly affected Iran’, s economy and caused adverse social impacts on Iranian lives. In the shadow of Iran’, s dark image in the eyes of the world, one issue that has remained overshadowed by the discussions on the impact and effectiveness of the sanctions, is the severe human rights crises left by the EU sanctions. The key question is what have been the human rights and humanitarian consequences of the EU sanctions for Iran, and how serious have these consequences been for the country? As the author argues in this paper, EU economic sanctions against Iran are considered violations of the three main generations of human rights and are therefore unwarranted. Given this, the resumption of sanctions since 2018 would lead to a human rights disaster in Iran. The effect of these sanctions will not affect the Iranian government, but the Iranian civilians, especially the vulnerable, which will undermine their human dignity.

In recent decades, international sanctions have become a recurring feature in political interactions between some governments. The United States has imposed the most economic sanctions since World War II. Also, several actions have been taken by the United Nations in recent years. In this study, the effect of economic sanctions of the United Nations and the United States on the misery index during the years 1991-2020 has been investigated by using the generalized least squares (GLS) method. The results indicate that the United Nations and United States sanctions have a significant effect on the misery index. On average, the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations and the United States have increased the misery index of the target country by 8.12 and 6.49, respectively. Also, the positive and increasing effect caused by the application of comprehensive economic sanctions of the United Nations on the misery index is more than the sanctions of the United States. IntroductionBefore the First World War, the countries with high military and economic power used the only means available to implement their desired policies in the target countries through war. However, since 1914 during the First World War and more widely since 1990, the military powers replaced the lever of war with economic and political sanctions to advance their goals in different countries (Medlicot, 1952). In recent decades, international sanctions have become a recurring feature in political relations between some states. Difficulties caused by embargo can take different forms. Experts consider sanctions as economic tools that affect the economic interests of countries. According to what has been said, the innovation of this article is to examine the impact of economic sanctions of the United Nations and the United States on the misery index of the target countries, including Iran. Methodology and MethodsThe current research is an applied research in terms of its purpose. In this study, documentary methods will be used to identify variables and collect information, and statistical and econometric methods will be used for its analysis. The statistics and information needed for the research were extracted from the information available on the official website of the World Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, the websites of the United States Congress and the United Nations website. In the present study, to evaluate the effects of the economic sanctions of the United Nations and the United States on the misery index of the sanctioned countries, the following model is estimated following the studies of Karimi et al.    Where Yi,t is the dependent variable, 𝑋i,t represents a vector of control variables including liquidity (broad money) (LIQ), capital stock (K), gross domestic product at constant US dollar prices (2010=100) (GDP) and the degree of trade openness (𝑇𝑂) is imports and exports divided by GDP , UNi,t is the independent variable of United Nations sanctions, USi,t is the independent variable of United States sanctions, 𝛼i is the  intercept, δt is the time effects on the constant term,  is the error term of the model. ConclusionThe results of the estimation showed that the effect of United Nations and United States sanctions on the misery index was positive and significant. UN sanctions with a coefficient of 8.12 and sanctions of the United States with a coefficient of 6.49 have been effective on the misery index. Also, according to the results of the study, proper liquidity management, reducing the economy's dependence on certain product income, reviewing business relations and moving and replacing business partners are among the solutions that can play an effective role in reducing the negative consequences of sanctions for the target countries. To solve each of the two problems of inflation and stagnation, special policies are used, and generally, the monetary policies used for inflationary conditions are opposite to the policies that can be used for stagnation, in such a way that in economic theories, in inflationary conditions, monetary contractionary policies are used in recessionary conditions. Monetary expansion and fiscal expansion policy are suggested. But in a situation where the increase in the misery index is caused by the simultaneous increase in inflation and unemployment, it is very difficult to choose and apply the right policy in such a way that the implementation of a monetary contraction policy will lead to stagnation and an expansionary monetary policy will also lead to inflation. Economic management has special requirements in the context of the intensification of sanctions.

In this paper, an empirical study has been conducted to document the effects of US sector-specific sanctions on publicly-traded firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The withdrawal of the US from JCPOA on May 8th, 2018 is considered the main event, and the GARCH (1, 1) model has been utilized along with the OLS estimation of a market model for the estimation of abnormal returns within 11 working days following the event. A multifactor statistical model of expected returns is also considered for controlling the potential effects of the changes in the foreign exchange rate and the risk-free rate of return on the abnormal returns of different firms. The potential effect of size, profitability, and leverage for each firm on the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and being the target of sector-specific sanctions has been controlled. The results showed that the withdrawal of the US from JCPOA induces a two-day cumulative abnormal return of about-1% for the firms which operate in industries targeted by US sectoral sanctions compared to non-target firms. The effect remains significant for about two weeks. Similarly, the effect of Trump's victory in the presidential election in 2016 on targeted firms is estimated to be significant. Other events in which Trump has speculated about the chance of withdrawal from the JCPOA have no significant effect on the stock market.

Analyzing the effects of energy and financial sanctions on the output gap of the economy of Iran is the aim of this study. To do so, a New-Keynesian DSGE model is used to design the structure of model. In this approach, by defining a shock, energy and financial sanctions is included into objective functions of the economic agents whereby the behavior of households in subsectors, consumption, capital accumulation and investment spending, and also the behavior of firm in production function and marginal cost are affected by energy and financial sanctions since 2011. The data in this study is quarterly for the period 1989 – 2014. To this end the output gap is computed by Kalman filter approach and other variables are filtered by Hodrick – Prescott method. Then by using Bayesian methods, the structural parameters are estimated, where, the results from MCMC Statistic, Gelman-Brooks statistic and comparing prior and posterior distribution functions indicate that the results are credible. Finally, the effects of energy and financial sanctions on the output gap and other variables have been analyzed by stochastic simulation. The results from simulation reveals that by imposing economic sanctions, investment spending, total consumption and the process of capital accumulation declines and the costs associated with output increased thereby the output gap in economy tends to increase. Moreover, from the results of variance decomposition, investment and inflation rate is more influenced by sanctions than other shocks.

The evolution of the Security Council sanctions approach and its focus on individuals, groups and legal persons instead of States as traditional targets of the sanctions, and the procedures of adding a name to the consolidate list of a sanctions committee and removing it from that list without respecting the basic standards of the right to a fair trail or process, has provoked serious critics considering the Council legal obligation in this regard. While these procedures were amended, under the pressure from the General Assembly, European Countries, European Union and the others, but are not yet enough to meet the demands of the right to a fair trail or process.

During the last three decades, financial sanctions have been imposed on Iran by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations Security Council. This paper aims at estimating the effect of financial sanctions on the import of capital and intermediate goods in Iran, which was carried out for two independent time periods. The first period (2010-2013) includes multilateral financial sanctions, and the second period (2016-2019) includes multilateral sanctions and the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. We examined the impact using the difference-in-difference (DID) method. The results of the first period indicate that the decrease in the imports of capital and intermediate goods in Iran depends more on the countries that "provided the sanctions plan" than the countries that did not provide the sanctions plan, because the coefficient of dummy variable for implementation in the random effects model is statistically significant. The negative effect of 0.007 on imports shows that the effect is weak, because this group of countries behaved differently. In the second period, the random effects model is statistically significant. In this model, the negetive effect of 0.22 on imports indicates a significant effect. Therefore, the reduction of Iran's imports in this period depends more on the countries that provided the sanctions plan than the countries that did not provide the plan.